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Abstract 
Limited attention is a defining feature of bounded rationality. In this chapter, we survey key research topics on 
attention in organizational context. Since the early years of the Carnegie school, organizations have been 
interpreted as responses to human attentional limits. This has led to focus on how organizations provide 
through hierarchical decision making and task design “attention-directors” as a response to human cognitive 
bounds. We look at the developments of these original ideas, and to more recent approaches such as the 
attention-based view of the firm. We point at some specific mechanisms that can shape and guide attention 
allocation within organizations: control systems, communication, corporate governance, and incentives. We 
also present how attention allocation can have consequences for organizations’ learning and adaptation to their 
environment. Finally, we shortly discuss the recent burst of an “inattention” literature in economics. We 
conclude with a set of suggestions for possible future research in this field. 
1. Bounded rationality, attention and organizations: the Carnegie perspective 
“(...) in an information-rich world, the wealth of information (...) creates a poverty of attention and a need 
to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume 
it.” (Simon, 1971, p. 40). 
The allocation of attention is commonly seen as a fundamental problem for organizations (Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw 2008, Ocasio 2011, Joseph and Wilson 2018).  Developing Barnard’s (1938) intuition that 
“narrowing choice” is a central function of executive decisions, Simon (1947) early on identified the process 
of directing and channeling managers’ attention as a key function of organizations, and also provided the 
almost iconic description of attention management featured in the above quote.  The foundations for such 
perspectives rely on the central role that limited attention provides in defining bounded rationality (Simon 
1983).  The “limits” of decision-making rationality are to a large extent the resultants of the attentional 
bottleneck (Simon 1947). 
The notion that attention is a scarce resource and that its allocation is central to intelligent behavior has, of 
course, a longer history and deep roots in psychology. Administrative Behavior resorts to classical sources 
such as James (1890) and Tolman (1932) to provide the conceptual background and basic definitions of 
attention.  
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“Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one 
out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, 
of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with 
others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in 
French is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in German.” (James 1890, p. 403-404) 
However, what characterizes organizational views of attention is “a dual emphasis on cognition (limited 
attention capacity) and structure (how organization shapes individual’s attention).” (Festré and Garouste 
2015). Just like cognitive limitations of individuals help explain how organizations are structured, 
organizations in turn help understand how individual attention is distributed and coordinated in collective 
systems. 
Early work from the Carnegie School (Simon 1947, March and Simon 1958) has emphasized some 
fundamental ways in which organizations provide “attention-directors” as a response to human cognitive 
limits. To that end, two general, hierarchical systems were proposed to design the architecture of attention in 
organizations. 
1) Decision hierarchies. “Prior controlling decisions” create a narrow frame of action for individual decision 
makers. Organizations provide a stratification of decisions levels that allow decisions on the spot to be 
guided by broader rationality considerations. Thus, organizational hierarchies can be seen as nested 
systems of decision premises ensuring that lower-level decisions are constrained and coordinated by 
higher-level ones.  
2) Division of labor.  Organizations design and assign tasks to single members, and thus direct their attention 
to those tasks. By reducing interdependences between different tasks, organizations reduce the number of 
features that each agent has to pay attention to. Tasks have to be designed in ways that are compatible with 
individual attention capacity (the “span of attention”, March and Simon 1958). Division of labor 
determines selective perception by agents specialized in a task. For example, Dearborne and Simon (1958) 
have shown how industrial executives see the aspects of a situation that relate to the tasks and goals of 
their department.  
In the original Simon’s framework, decision premises and division of labor create a close connection between 
attention and (sub)goals. Both processes define a hierarchy of subgoals attached to tasks that selectively orient 
individual actions. The conceptual frame here is one of collective problem solving Cyert and March (1963) 
introduce a more genuine political perspective on goals and attention.  It is a natural implication of the notion 
of limited attention that individuals cannot simultaneously attend to all dimensions of a decision, and thus 
attention to different features can only be allocated sequentially (Simon 1947).  If attention to goals is limited, 
shifts in attention will affect preference orderings.  Cyert and March (1963) focus on how attentional dynamics 
affect organizational coalition-making.  They suggest that stakeholders in organizations generally have 
conflicting goals that make it impossible to find stable and consistent set of organizational objectives. Instead, 
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organizations can resolve conflicting demands on their decisions by paying attention to different goals in a 
sequential rather than simultaneous way. For example, when there are conflicting pressures to “smooth 
production” and “satisfy consumers” the problem could be resolved by first satisfying the former and then the 
later. “Quasi-resolution of conflict” becomes an alternative to the standard view of organizational coalition 
making, opposing shifting attention to side-payments, and dynamic inconsistency of goals to coherent 
solutions. 
Two important further contributions stemmed from the original Carnegie approach, providing new insights 
and a different perspective on attention in organizations: the garbage can model and the attention-based theory 
of the firm. 
While Cyert and March emphasize the political implications of the sequential allocation of attention, the 
garbage can model (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) explores its coordination implications in non-routine 
decision-making.  Taking a radical departure from traditional models of organizational decision-making, the 
garbage can model explores “organized anarchies” in which preferences are problematic, technologies are 
unclear, and participation is fluid. Despite its quite radical language the garbage can model combines important 
elements of the Carnegie tradition: the “ambiguity of goals” further develops the Cyert-March's sequential 
attention to goals. Attention is a scare resource, participants to decision processes can pay attention to only 
one choice at a time, and they have a preference for focusing on choices being close to be made. The main 
novelty of the model comes from the way these ingredients are combined into a flow of independent streams 
of decision makers, choice opportunities, and problems. As it has been noted (Ocasio 2012), this introduces 
an ecological view of how attention is allocated in organizations. Patterns of coordinated organizational 
decision-making arise from the competing demands on the participants' attention and the way they are 
streaming over time. The result is a subversion of the classical problem-solving structure. Most choices are 
made by flight (as problems move to other choice opportunities) or by oversight (as most problems still have 
to be attached to a choice arena), rather than by resolution. Again, some similarity with Cyert and March quasi-
resolution of conflict can be noticed. In organized anarchies, choices are made because the attention of decision 
makers is focused on issues from which conflicting demands have been temporarily removed.  Distraction has 
an adaptive value. 
Building on the dual emphasis on structure and cognition by Simon (1947) and other earlier works (March and 
Simon 1958, Cyert and March 1963, Cohen et al. 1972, Weick 1979), Ocasio (1997) developed the attention-
based view of the firm (ABV). Ocasio describes organizations as systems of structurally distributed attention 
and defines attention as a cognitive process that encompass the "noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing 
of time and effort by organizational decision-makers" on issues and answers (Ocasio 1997, p. 189). Ocasio, 
whose definition echoes the one provided by James (1890), emphasizes the relevance of attention in decision-
making, as already underscored by Simon (1947, p. 110). is theory highlights the relationship between 
individual and organizational information processing: (i) actions of decision-makers and subsequent 
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organizational moves depend on the issues and answers the former focus their attention on; (ii) in turn, 
decision-makers' focus of attention depends on specific situatFion and the organizational and environmental 
context they are in. Later, Ocasio (2011) stresses that attention can be classified into three interacting varieties: 
(i) attentional perspective, which refers to the focus of attention across space and time; (ii) attentional 
engagement, that is, the extent by which a firm attends to organizational agendas and sustains vigilance in 
problem solving over time; (iii) attentional selection, and thus the decision as to which stimuli to address at 
any given time. Subsequent ABV studies focused mostly on topics such as the effect of attention structures on 
decision-making (e.g., Maula et al. 2013, Wilson and Joseph 2015) and top-down and bottom-up attentional 
processes (e.g., Shepherd et al. 2007, Zbaracki and Bergen 2015). Joseph and Wilson (2018) amalgamate these 
two topics: Whereas previous ABV studies mostly focused on the consequences of the distribution of attention, 
these authors also stress the role played by organizational tensions and architectural complexity in influencing 
the distribution of attention. 
2. Attention at work: organizational mechanisms. 
While the Carnegie classics deal with attention in broad terms, they also provide a way to look at familiar 
organizational phenomena in a new perspective. Different organizational mechanisms have been analyzed in 
terms of attentional processes, allowing a reinterpretation of their functions and ways of operating. Here we 
will focus on some examples. 
Control systems (and more generally accounting systems) provide an interesting case, and they have been 
among the first to be analyzed in an attention framework. Control systems are usually described as information 
feedback systems. Goals and targets are set, current results are regularly compared with the targets, and 
feedback is used to correct deviations and keep the organization focused on implementing its original strategies 
(Anthony et al. 2007).  However, a focus on attention may suggest a different interpretation. In their study of 
the controller’s department in seven organizations, Simon et al. (1954) had already made a distinction between 
score-card and attention-directing use of information. The score-card question is “Am I doing well or badly”? 
The attention-directing one is “what problems should I look into?” (Simon et al.1954, p.3). Simon and his 
collaborators observed that the attention-directing use of control systems is always paired with the score-card 
one.  Attentional uses of control systems are tightly related to the exertion of the “principle of exception”: 
accounting data direct the attention of managers towards “out of line” situations and trigger direct hierarchical 
intervention to address them. In a subsequent study encompassing 19 major companies, Simons (1991) found 
that top managers use selectively control systems to focus attention on strategic uncertainties. As a result, 
control systems favor the generation of new strategic initiatives in response to emergent uncertainties, rather 
than just supporting the implementation of current strategies. In a similar vein, Vanderbosch (1999) finds that 
executive support systems have the fundamental function of concentrating management attention and helping 
managers to have a focusing influence on the organization.   
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March and Simon (1958) suggested that the structure of communication channels in organizations will affect 
attention-allocation phenomena by determining which type of stimuli will reach which type of organizational 
members, and the awareness agents have of the consequences of their actions. Recent research, mostly in the 
light of Ocasio’s ABV theory, has stressed the role of communication channels in the process of attentional 
engagement. Ocasio and Joseph (2005) extended the ABV theory by explaining the structure and role of 
communication channels in distribution of organizational attention, and formulation and implementation of 
strategic plan. Distribution and integration of attention occur through the organization’s communication 
channels (Joseph and Ocasio 2012). Recent studies demonstrate how distribution of attention is affected by 
specific communication channels. For example, Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) explain how subsidiary firms 
may actively gain or lose the positive attention and efforts of their parent corporate headquarters managers, 
and how they can have more control over the attention their parent companies dedicate to them. Dutton et al. 
(2001) explore issue selling and describe how managers’ initiatives may shape the attention of top 
management, and thereby, influence the organizational moves and performance. 
Most attention research primarily focuses on structures of communication channels to measure the response 
to the environmental stimuli (Joseph and Ocasio, 2012). Ocasio et al. (2018) propose communication as a 
process by which actors can attend to and engage with organizational and environmental issues and initiatives. 
Using the example of Apple and Motorola companies, Ocasio and Joseph (2018) demonstrate that integrating 
attention through communication channels with the communications within those channels can be useful in 
reaching coherence in strategy formulation and implementation. 
Corporate governance mechanisms also affect patterns of attention at the top of organizations, sometimes in 
subtle ways.  In particular, the board composition matters, as it affects the diversity of cognitive lenses through 
which board members look at issues. Tuggle et al. (2010a, 2010b) argue that heterogeneity on a board of 
directors influences their patterns of attention by affecting how boards allocate their attention between 
monitoring functions and discussing new entrepreneurial issues. Tuggle at al. (2010a) analyze a sample of 210 
firms by collecting data on board compositions and the text of their board minutes. They suggest that tenure 
variance, firm/industry background heterogeneity, and the proportion of directors with output-oriented 
backgrounds are positively associated with the discussion of entrepreneurial issues. Some recent studies 
examine how governance may affect the attention given to issues and the responses that are formulated. 
Galbreath’s findings (2018) highlight that certain attention structures link boards inasmuch boards engage in 
environmental scanning and stakeholder debate. Galbreath also finds interaction between environmental 
scanning and women on boards, and between stakeholder debate and women on boards. Gender diversity is 
likely to shift attention through a change in the nature of the attention-directing structures (e.g., environmental 
scanning, stakeholder debate), rather than through a direct effect. 
Surprisingly, little heed has been paid to the role of incentives in directing attention in organizations, despite 
Simon’s (1947) early remark that motivation (together with emotion) is the mechanism responsible for the 
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allocation of attention to competing tasks. It is somehow ironic that inquiry into the role of incentive 
mechanisms as attention allocation systems has been mostly left to “rational” theories of organizations, in 
particular to agency models. In their seminal paper on multitasking, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have 
pointed out that “when there are multiple tasks, incentive pay not only serves to allocate risks and motivate 
hard work, but also direct the allocation of the agents' attention among their various duties” (p. 25).  In their 
view, attention is a scarce resource that agents have to allocate among tasks that exert competing pressure.  
Incentives will affect which dimensions of his/her job an agent will pay attention to. As a result, “an increase 
in an agent's compensation in any specific task will cause some reallocation of attention away from other 
tasks”. 
Despite its original rationalistic flavor, the problem of multitasking offers an important window on 
mechanisms directing attention in organizations and invites closer empirical analysis.  There is ample 
psychological evidence supporting the claim that incentives have an important role in directing human 
attention among competing stimuli. Stimuli associated to rewards gain prominence in individual attention and 
are recognized more promptly (O’Brien and Raymond 2012). If this can generally help to maintain attention 
focused on relevant items, it can also generate peculiar distortions. For example, stimuli that are associated to 
rewards but are irrelevant to the current task can capture attention and distract from task-relevant attention 
(Anderson et al. 2011).   
Similar phenomena seem to emerge at the collective level of organized activity. In her excellent review on the 
provision of incentives on firms, Prendergast (1999) provides ample documentation on the potentially 
distortive effects of incentives on the allocation of attention (and consequently, selective effort), especially in 
multitasking situations.  For example, when agents are subject to piece-rate incentives, they are less likely to 
help other workers (Drago and Garvey 199n8). This applies also to temporal allocation: when incentives are 
provided in rather distant moments of time, a distorted temporal allocation of effort is often observed, with 
much effort concentrated before the evaluation date, and then falling again after evaluation (Asch 1990). While 
these effects can be attributed to rational calculation (e.g., distorted temporal allocation of effort may result 
from intertemporal discounting, Prendergast 1999), an interpretation in terms of limited attention seems 
equally plausible. More research is needed to disentangle these two explanations. 
An especially interesting example of how attention relates to incentives is provided by the so-called crowding 
out problem (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Fehr and List 2004, Gneezy et al. 2011).  It has been repeatedly 
observed that explicit incentives addressed at inducing behaviors such as cooperation, trust, or education may 
actually produce a contrary effect. For example, pro-social behavior may actually be discouraged rather than 
favored by the introduction of monetary incentives meant to support it. A well-known case is that of blood 
donation: the introduction of a monetary reward for blood donors does actually cause a drop in blood donation, 
unless an option is left to leave money to a charity (Mellström and Johannesso 2008). In the employment 
relationship, the introduction of incentives that rely on monitoring and fining agents that underperform may 
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significantly decrease the agents’ effort (Fehr and Gächter 2002). A basic explanation of the crowding out 
effect relies on the fact that incentives direct attention towards certain features of social interaction (Heyman 
and Ariely 2004) and thus induce different frames of the decision situation (Gneezy et al. 2011).   
3. The adaptive value of (in)attention 
Organizations can be conceived as adaptive responses to the cognitive limits of individuals. “Organizations 
will have structure (…) insofar as there are boundaries of rationality (…) If there were not boundaries to 
rationality (…) there could be no stable organizational structure” (Match and Simon 1958, p.192). A 
fundamental function of organizations is to manage the gap between the overabundance of information in the 
world and the limited attention of individual minds. Many features of organizational structures and 
mechanisms are responses to such limitation (Simon 1971).  
However, attention is not just a problem organization have to solve. Attentional processes significantly 
contribute to how organizations adapt to their environments, and as such they have their own, relevant adaptive 
value. First of all, attentional processes are a fundamental trigger of organizational adaptive responses (Simon 
1947, Nigam and Ocasio 2010). Sequential shifts in attention are especially relevant to understand adaptive 
change, also because they connect cognitive components to the reshaping of organizational coalitions. In his 
analysis of corporate environmentalism from 1960 to1993, Hoffman (1999) shows how changes in the 
chemical industry have been triggered by attention shifts related to specific events. These changes were 
accompanied by transformations in the patterns of interactions among stakeholders.   
Attentional processes have adaptive relevance also because they affect which features of the environment 
organizations pay attention to as they change. Individuals and organizations do not consider all stimuli from 
their environment but pay attention selectively to only a few of them (Ocasio 1997). This leads to selective 
responses that end up determining to which environmental subsystems organizational will adapt to.  Weick 
(1979) has aptly defined such a process as enactment: through focused attention and response, an organization 
selects (and to some extent “creates”) the environment to which it is adapting. This means that the fitness 
criteria that determine successful adaptation are to some extent endogenous, and that attention actively 
contributes to generating them. 
The adaptive value of attention is enhanced by the shifting nature of organization goals. The very notion of 
adaptive success depends upon the criteria with which organizational performance is defined.  As Cyert and 
March (1963) have suggested, a fundamental way in which organizations adapt is by learning which 
performance criteria to attend for. This also means that organizational learning defines its own criteria of 
success. Attentional shifts triggering change and the subsequent organizational adaptation may often result 
from the dynamics of aspiration levels connected to different goals. By analyzing growth patterns in the 
insurance industry, Greve (2008) has shown how firm’s growth may be the result of a shift of attention to size 
when profitability goals are satisfied. 
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Whereas attentional constraints may be seen as a cognitive limitation, they also bring some advantages as far 
as adaptive processes are concerned. The “less is more” argument (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999) seems to apply 
also in the context of attention allocation. In this context, it is worth noticing that scholars of language 
acquisition have suggested that processing limits of children increase their ability to learn a language (Newport 
1990, Ellman 1993) because processing limits favor focusing on the crucial components of language. In a 
related essay, Kareev (1995) has shown that processing limitations can produce positive bias in detecting 
correlations in the environment, which in turn may enhance early detection of potentially informative 
relationships among variables. A first important implication of attentional limit is that only a few features of 
experience are indeed considered feed learning. In a dimensionally rich environment, limiting attention to a 
few features can certainly limit in the long term the accuracy of learning processes.  However, it can 
considerably improve the speed of learning and adaptive performance in the short run. “Speed of learning 
favors selective attention” (Kruschke and Hullinger 2010). If organizations have limited time to learn, in some 
environments this advantage may turn out to be important. Knudsen and Warglien (2018) show that in skewed 
environments where different cues have different informative value, agents with limited attention will learn 
from a subset of features only and adapt faster than “broad minded” agents that consider all features presented 
by experience. Moreover, if short-term learning-speed advantage leads organizations to have access to more 
information (e.g., because they acquire more customers), the adaptive advantage might become a permanent 
one even in the long run. Finally, attention limits may reduce the negative effects of overfitting that may be 
caused by considering a too-large asset of variables in learning (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2009); in fact, they 
act as a sort of “model selection” constraint that improves the robustness of inferences. Whether these 
advantages of limited processing apply to organizational learning is still an open and under-investigated issue 
that certainly deserves more attention. 
4. Inattention: from the economist point of view. 
Limited attention (often: inattention) ha become a hot topic in economics. Many economists have no problems 
in assuming that attention is a scarce resource, and as such an excellent subject for economic inquiry. Gabaix 
(2017) offers an excellent introduction to this rapidly growing field of inquiry and suggests that the concept of 
limited attention has the potential to explain and unify many behavioral anomalies. 
The basic paradigm of inattention is that when agents receive a signal with n dimensions, agents “pay attention” 
only to m < n dimensions, substituting the signal value with a default one in the remaining n-m dimensions. In 
more graded version, they can pay “partial” attention to each dimension, adjusting the default value in direction 
of the signal value. Regardless, inattention generates an “anchoring and adjustment” process in which the set 
of defaults is partially adjusted towards the signal values. Gabaix (2017) shows how a large set of familiar 
decision-making biases can be modeled as special cases of the inattention paradigm. For example, quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997) can be modeled as inattention to the future, providing a simple 
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interpretation of intertemporal-choice anomalies. This interpretation is also normatively manageable, as 
exponential discounting can be preserved in this case the normative reference. 
Organizational economics has provided some interesting applications of the inattention paradigm to classical 
organizational issues. Consider for example the tradeoffs between the two most general forms of organizational 
coordination (March and Simon 1958): decentralized communication (“coordination by feedback”) and 
standardized behavior (e.g., through standard operating procedures). It is possible to frame such tradeoffs in 
attentional terms. Decentralized communication taxes agents’ attention, while standard operating procedures 
save attention resources by making use of a default. Dessein and Santos (2006) build a simple model in which 
the quality of communication between two organizational agents is a function of the cost of attention. Agents 
have aligned interests (a team model), must perform multiple tasks, and their payoff depends on (a) how 
accurately their action matches the current state of the environment and (b) on how well they coordinate their 
actions. The “standard operating procedure” captures the optimal response to the average state of the 
environment. There are n tasks to coordinate, and each agent is allocated a task – and only he/she can observe 
the current state of the environment in such dimension and transmit it to the other agents – but successful 
transmission is a function of attention. Dessein and Santos show that attentional factors determine the 
adaptability of an organization: under low-attention conditions, standard procedures minimize the cost of 
miscoordination but make the organization unresponsive, as the agent that observes the true state to the 
environment will prefer to act according to standard procedures rather than respond to the current state, thereby 
incurring in the risk of miscoordination with other agents. Moreover, they show that attention limits division 
of labor: as tasks are more fractioned, organizations become more rigid as the cost of miscoordination by 
feedback will increase with the number of tasks to coordinate. 
In a subsequent development of the model, Dessein, Galeotti and Santos (2016) show that organizations can 
structure in asymmetric ways the distribution of attention, by focusing all coordination by feedback on a few 
focal tasks while leaving other tasks to standardized behavior. This example shows the remarkable potential 
for a dialogue between the economics of inattention and the models of bounded rationality. The role of 
standard-operating procedures as economizers of attention, the interactions of attention and division of labor, 
and hybrid models of coordination in which standardization of some tasks frees attention for non-routine 
coordination, are classical themes of the Carnegie tradition, and these recent models offer new insights and 
qualifications that enrich our understanding of these issues. An interesting aspect is that such models are 
typically equilibrium ones, and require that attentional limits are common knowledge, which is a problem 
leading to well-known problems of “super-rational” awareness of bounded rationality.   
Open questions 
The number of studies on “attention to attention” have been steadily increasing in recent years, but there are 
important theoretical areas and empirical issues that still need to be addressed and offer relevant opportunities 
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for new research (e.g., van Knippenberg et al. 2015). Here we suggest a few of them that we find of special 
priority. 
1. Better integrating organizational attention and organizational learning models. Models of organizational 
learning do not usually consider the effect of attentional factors on adaptive performance. Particularly 
important issues concern the potential benefits of attention limits: Does bounded attention improve learning 
performance? In which type of environments? What attention mechanisms favor learning? A second major 
terra incognita is how attentional mechanisms help to cope with changes in the structure of the environment. 
Most organizational learning models consider only stationary environments. On the other hand, empirical 
studies suggest that attention plays a major role in how organizations perceive disruptive events and trigger 
response to changing environments. The study of adaptation to non-stationary environments opens a set of 
new questions for students of organizational learning. Some of them are exquisitely attentional. How is non-
stationarity recognized?  And, if it is recognized, what forces may determine under- (or maybe over-) reaction? 
How does responding to novelty imply redistributing attentional across organizational members?   
2. Organizational politics and attention. Organizational cognition and the study of political processes in 
organization have remained substantially separate domains of inquiry (Kaplan 2008). As originally suggested 
by Cyert and March (1963), the allocation of attention is a crucial connecting link between these two domains. 
One area where this is especially evident is organizational communication. Communication affects selective 
attention (Entman 1993) and helps determining the frames through which organizational actors perceive and 
interpret decision-making issues and their own interest (Kaplan 2008). This offers opportunities to model 
“cognitive coalitions” in organizations in which the patterns of alignment of organizational actors in coalitions 
depend on which dimensions of the coalitional problem are activated by selective attention. Interestingly 
enough, this seems also an issue that lends itself naturally to experimental treatment. A model of quasi-
resolution of conflict might be mature. 
3. Attention failures. The negative side of the attention limits is the failure of individuals and organizations to 
detect relevant events and understand changes in their environment (Bansal et al. 2018).  Bounded awareness 
is the other face of focusing, as it hampers people from considering relevant, available, and perceivable 
information for informed decision-making (Chugh and Bazerman 2007). This focusing failure is closely 
related to well-documented psychology research, such as “inattentional blindness” (Neisser 1979), “focalism” 
(Wilson et al. 2010), and “information avoidance’’ (Golman et al. 2017). This a general problem: for example, 
Zegart (2006) pointed out that despite the many signals collected about the possibility of a severe terroristic 
threat, the counterterrorism agencies did not adjust rapidly enough to prevent the 11 September 2001 attacks. 
This adaptation failure, which originated in politics, had the consequence that the agencies involved failed to 
achieve the changes they believed were needed very urgently. Identifying the organizational mechanisms 
responsible for collective attention failures may require to go beyond analogies with individual processes and, 
instead, articulate how the distribution of attention and the communication channels integrating it work or do 
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not work in detecting threats (e.g., Rerup 2009, Vuori and Huy 2016) and opportunities (Shepherd et al. 2017) 
outside the attentional focus of an organization. This topic may require looking more carefully into the 
processes through which organization update or fail to update their attention rules (Cyert and March 1963) by 
responding to weak signals from the environment. 
4. Developing experimental paradigms. Ocasio (2011) has lamented a lack of cumulativity in research on 
organizational attention. One natural research strategy to increase cumulativity would be to put both theoretical 
propositions and inspirations from field observations into hypotheses that can be tested through careful, 
reproducible laboratory experimentation. Despite the burgeoning development of experimental paradigms to 
study attention in psychology (e.g., Fawcett et al. 2015), very little has been done in the field of organization 
research. Experiments on organizational attention should address aspects that are usually absent in 
psychological research but would be key parameters in the design of an organizational lab setting. Three of 
them are especially relevant. (a) The distribution of attention. A fundamental feature of organizations is that 
attention is structurally distributed. Experiments should enable to specify the distribution of attention of agents. 
(b) Mechanisms of attention integration. Organizations provide a multiplicity of mechanisms integrating 
individual attention processes (hierarchies, decision premises, communication, etc.). An organizational 
experiment should enable to evaluate how these mechanisms interact with attention distribution in affecting 
organizational performance. (c) Strategic aspects of attention. Experiments should enable control of the effect 
of how different interests affect attention allocation. Examples include the effect of incentives, attention 
capture, and strategic manipulation of agendas. 
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